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Abstract—The convolutional neural network (CNN) architec-
ture is increasingly being applied to new domains, such as
malware detection, where it is able to learn malicious behavior
from raw bytes extracted from executables. These architectures
reach impressive performance with no feature engineering effort
involved, but their robustness against active attackers is yet
to be understood. Such malware detectors could face a new
attack vector in the form of adversarial interference with the
classification model. Existing evasion attacks intended to cause
misclassification on test-time instances, which have been exten-
sively studied for image classifiers, are not applicable because
of the input semantics that prevents arbitrary changes to the
binaries. This paper explores the area of adversarial examples
for malware detection. By training an existing model on a
production-scale dataset, we show that some previous attacks
are less effective than initially reported, while simultaneously
highlighting architectural weaknesses that facilitate new attack
strategies for malware classification. Finally, we explore how
generalizable different attack strategies are, the trade-offs when
aiming to increase their effectiveness, and the transferability of
single-step attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of convolutional neural network (CNN)
classifiers has lead to their adoption in fields which have been
historically adversarial, such as malware detection [1], [2].
Recent advances in adversarial machine learning have high-
lighted weaknesses of classifiers when faced with adversarial
samples. One such class of attacks is evasion [3], which acts
on test-time instances. The instances, also called adversarial
examples, are modified by the attacker such that they are
misclassified by the victim classifier even though they still
resemble their original representation. State-of-the-art attacks
focus mainly on image classifiers [4]–[7], where attacks add
small perturbations to input pixels that lead to a large shift in
the victim classifier feature space, potentially shifting it across
the classification decision boundary. The perturbations do not
change the semantics of the image as a human oracle easily
identifies the original label associated with the image.
In the context of malware detection, adversarial examples
could represent an additional attack vector for an attacker
determined to evade such a system. However, domain-specific
challenges limit the applicability of existing attacks designed
against image classifiers on this task. First, the strict semantics
of binary files disallows arbitrary perturbations in the input
space. This is because there is a structural interdependence
between adjacent bytes, and any change to a byte value
could potentially break the functionality of the executable.
Second, limited availability of representative datasets or ro-
bust public models limits the generality of existing studies.
Existing attacks [8], [9] use victim models trained on very
small datasets, and make various assumptions regarding their
strategies. Therefore, the generalization effectiveness across
production-scale models and the trade-offs between various
proposed strategies is yet to be evaluated.
This paper sheds light on the generalization property of ad-
versarial examples against CNN-based malware detectors. By
training on a production-scale dataset of 12.5 million binaries,
we are able to observe interesting properties of adversarial
attacks, showing that their effectiveness could be misestimated
when small datasets are used for training, and that single-step
attacks are more effective against robust models trained on
larger datasets.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We measure the generalization property of adversarial
attacks across datasets, highlighting common properties
and trade-offs between various strategies.
• We unearth an architectural weakness of a published
CNN architecture that facilitates existing attack strate-
gies [8], [9].
• We investigate the transferability of single-step adversar-
ial examples across models trained on different datasets.
II. BACKGROUND
The CNN architecture has proven to be very successful
across popular vision tasks, such as image classification [10].
This lead to an increased adoption in other fields and do-
mains, with one such example being text classification from
character-level features [11], which turns out to be extremely
similar to the malware classification problem discussed in
this paper. In this setting, a natural language document is
represented as a sequence of characters, and the CNN is
applied on that one-dimensional stream of characters. The
intuition behind this approach is that a CNN is capable of
automatically learning complex features, such as words or
word sequences, by observing compositions of raw signals
extracted from single characters. This approach also avoids the
requirement of defining language semantic rules, and is able
to tolerate anomalies in features, such as word misspellings.
The classification pipeline first encodes each character into
a fixed-size embedding vector. The sequence of embeddings
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Fig. 1: Architecture for the MalConv Model.
acts as input to a set of convolutional layers, intermixed
with pooling layers, then followed by fully connected layers.
The convolutional layers act as receptors, picking particular
features from the input instance, while the pooling layers act as
filters to down-sample the feature space. The fully connected
layers act as a non-linear classifier on the internal feature
representation of instances.
A. CNNs for Malware Classification.
Similar to this approach, the security community explored
the applicability of CNNs to the task of malware detection.
Raff et al. [1] and Krcˇa´l et al. [2] use the CNNs on a raw
byte representation, whereas Davis and Wolff [12] use it on
disassembled functions. In this work we focus on the raw byte
representation. In an analogy to the text domain, an executable
file could be conceptualized as a sequence of bytes that are
arranged into higher-level features, such as instructions or
functions. By allowing the classifier to automatically learn
features indicative of maliciousness, this approach avoids the
labor-intensive feature engineering process typical of malware
classification tasks. Manual feature engineering proved to be
challenging in the past and led to an arms race between
antivirus developers and attackers aiming to evade them [13].
However, the robustness of these automatically learned fea-
tures in the face of evasion is yet to be understood.
In this paper, we explore evasion attacks by focusing
on a byte-based convolutional neural network for malware
detection, called MalConv [1], whose architecture is shown
in Figure 1. MalConv reads up to 2MB of raw byte values
from a Portable Executable (PE) file as input, appending
a distinguished padding token to files smaller than 2MB
and truncating extra bytes from larger files. The fixed-length
sequences are then transformed into an embedding repre-
sentation, where each byte is mapped to an 8-dimensional
embedding vector. These embeddings are then passed through
a gated convolutional layer, followed by a temporal max-
pooling layer, before being classified through a final fully
connected layer. Each convolutional layer uses a kernel size of
500 bytes with a stride of 500 (i.e., non-overlapping windows),
and each of the 128 filters is passed through a max-pooling
layer. This results in a unique architectural feature that we
will revisit in our results: each pooled filter is mapped back to
a specific 500-byte sequence and there are at most 128 such
sequences that contribute to the final classification across the
entire input. Their reported results on a testing set of 77,349
samples achieved a Balanced Accuracy of 0.909 and Area
Under the Curve (AUC) of 0.982.
B. Adversarial Binaries.
Unlike evasion attacks on images [4]–[7], attacks that alter
the raw bytes of PE files must maintain the syntactic and
semantic fidelity of the original file. The Portable Executable
(PE) standard [14] defines a fixed structure for these files. A
PE file contains a leading header enclosing file metadata and
pointers to the sections of the file, followed by the variable-
length sections which contain the actual program code and
data. Changing bytes arbitrarily could break the malicious
functionality of the binary or, even worse, prevent it from
loading at all. Therefore, an attacker constrained to static
analysis of the binaries has limited leverage on the features
they can modify.
Recent work [8], [9] suggests two strategies of address-
ing these limitations. The first one avoids this problem by
appending adversarial noise to the end of the binary. Since
the appended adversarial bytes are not within the defined
boundaries of the PE file, their existence does not impact the
binary’s functionality and there are no inherent restrictions on
the syntax of bytes (i.e., valid instructions and parameters).
The trade-off, however, is that the impact of the appended
bytes on the final classification is offset by the features present
in the original sample, which remain unchanged. As we will
see, these attacks take advantage of certain vulnerabilities in
position-independent feature detectors present in the MalConv
architecture. The second strategy [9] seeks to discover regions
in the executable that are not mapped to memory and that,
upon modification, would not affect the intended behavior.
However, the utility of this approach compared to append
strategies has not been studied before. In this paper, we
evaluate the comparative effectiveness of the two strategies
at scale and highlight their transferability across models, as
well as trade-offs that might affect their general applicability.
C. Datasets.
To evaluate the success of evasion attacks against the Mal-
Conv architecture we utilize three datasets. First, we collected
16.3M PE files from a variety of sources, including VirusTotal,
Reversing Labs, and proprietary FireEye data. The data was
used to create a production-quality dataset of 12.5M training
samples and 3.8M testing samples, which we refer to as the
Full dataset. The corpus contains 2.2M malware samples in
the training set, and 1.2M in testing. The dataset was created
from a larger pool of more than 33M samples using a stratified
sampling technique based on malware family. Use of stratified
sampling ensures uniform coverage over the canonical ‘types’
of binaries present in the dataset, while also limiting bias from
certain overrepresented types (e.g., popular malware families).
Second, we utilize the EMBER dataset [15], which is a publicly
available dataset comprised of 1.1M PE files, out of which
900K are used for training. On this dataset, we use the pre-
trained MalConv model released with the dataset. In addition,
we also created a smaller dataset whose size and distribution
is more in line with Kolosnjaji et al.’s evaluation [8], which
we refer to as the Mini dataset. The Mini dataset was created
by sampling 4,000 goodware and 4,598 malware samples from
the Full dataset. Note that both datasets follow a strict temporal
split where test data was observed strictly later than training
data. We use the Mini dataset in order to explore whether
the attack results demonstrated by Kolosnjaji et al. would
generalize to a production-quality model, or whether they are
artifacts of the dataset properties.
III. BASELINE PERFORMANCE
To validate our implementation of the MalConv architec-
ture [1], we train the classifier on both the Mini and the Full
datasets, leaving out the DeCov regularization addition sug-
gested by the authors. Our implementation uses a momentum-
based optimizer with decay and a batch size of 80 instances.
We train on the Mini dataset for 10 full epochs. We also
trained the Full dataset for 10 epochs, but stopped the process
early due to a small validation loss1. To assess and compare
the performance of the two models, we test them on the
entire Full testing set. The model trained on the Full dataset
achieves an accuracy of 0.89 and an AUC of 0.97, which is
similar to the results published in the original MalConv paper.
Unsurprisingly, the Mini model is much less robust, achieving
an accuracy of 0.73 and an AUC of 0.82. The MalConv model
trained on EMBER was reported to achieve 0.99 AUC on the
corresponding test set.
IV. ATTACK STRATEGIES
We now present the attack strategies used throughout our
study and discuss their trade-offs.
A. Append Attacks
Append-based strategies address the semantic integrity con-
straints of PE files by appending adversarial noise to the orig-
inal file. We start by presenting two attacks first introduced by
Kolosnjaji et al. [8] and evaluated against MalConv, followed
by our two strategies intended to evaluate the robustness of
the classifier.
a) Random Append: This attack works by appending
byte values sampled from a uniform distribution. This baseline
attack measures how easily an append attack could offset
features derived from the file length, and helps compare the
actual adversarial gains from more complex append strategies
over random appended noise.
b) Gradient Append: The Gradient Append strategy uses
the input gradient value to guide the changes in the appended
byte values. The algorithm appends numBytes to the candi-
date sample and updates their values over numIter iterations
or until the victim classifier is evaded. The gradient of the
output with respect to the input layer indicates the direction,
in the input space, of the change required to minimize the
output, therefore pushing its value towards the benign class.
The representation of all appended bytes is iteratively updated,
starting from random values. However, as the input bytes are
mapped to a discrete embedding representation in MalConv,
the end-to-end architecture becomes non-differentiable and its
input gradient cannot be computed analytically. Therefore,
1This was also reported in the original MalConv study.
this attack uses a heuristic to instead update the embedding
vector and discretize it back in the byte space to the closest
byte value along the direction of the embedding gradient. We
refer interested readers to the original paper for details of this
discretization process [8]. The attack requires numBytes ∗
numIter gradient computations and updates to the appended
bytes in the worst case, which could be prohibitively expensive
for large networks.
c) Benign Append: This strategy allows us to observe
the susceptibility of the MalConv architecture, specifically its
temporal max-pooling layer, to attacks that reuse benign byte
sequences at the end of a file. The attack takes bytes from
the beginning of benign instances and appends them to the
end of a malicious instance. The intuition behind this attack
is that leading bytes of a file, and especially the PE headers,
are the most influential towards the classification decision [1].
Therefore, it signals whether the maliciousness of the target
could be offset by appending highly influential benign bytes.
Algorithm 1 The FGM Append attack
1: function FGMAPPEND(x0, numBytes, )
2: x0 ← PADRANDOM(x0, numBytes)
3: e← GETEMBEDDINGS(x0)
4: eu ← GRADIENTATTACK(e, )
5: for i in |x0|...|x0|+ numBytes− 1 do
6: e[i]← eu[i]
7: end for
8: x∗ ← EMBEDDINGMAPPING(e)
9: return x∗
10: end function
11: function GRADIENTATTACK(e, )
12: eu ← e−  ∗ sign(∇l(e))
13: return eu
14: end function
15: function EMBEDDINGMAPPING(ex)
16: e← ARRAY(256)
17: for byte in 0...255 do
18: e[byte]← GETEMBEDDINGS(byte)
19: end for
20: for i in 0...|ex| do
21: x∗[i]← argminb∈0...255(||ex[i]− e[b]||2)
22: end for
23: return x∗
24: end function
d) FGM Append: Based on the observation that the
convergence time of the Gradient Append attack grows linearly
with the number of appended bytes, we propose the “one-
shot” FGM Append attack, an adaptation of the Fast Gradient
Method (FGM) originally described in [5]. The adaptation of
the FGM attack to the malware domain was first proposed
by Kreuk et al. [9] in an iterative algorithm intended to
generate a small-sized adversarial payload. In contrast, our
attack strategy aims to highlight vulnerabilities of the model
as a function of the increasing adversarial leverage. The
pseudocode is described in Algorithm 1. Our attack starts by
appending numBytes random bytes to the original sample
x0 and updating them using a policy dictated by FGM. The
attack uses the classification loss l of the output with respect
to the target label. FGM updates each embedding value by a
user specified amount  in a direction that minimizes l on the
input, as dictated by the sign of the gradient ∇l. While this
attack framework is independent of the distance metric used
to quantify perturbations, our experiments use L∞. In order to
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Fig. 2: CDF of file sizes and activation locations determined
by MalConvs max pooling layer.
avoid the non-differentiability issue, our attack performs the
gradient-based updates of the appended bytes in the embed-
ding space, while mapping the updated value to the closest
byte value representation in EMBEDDINGMAPPING using the
L2 distance metric. A more sophisticated mapping could be
used to ensure that the update remains beneficial towards
minimizing the loss. However, we empirically observed that
the metric choice does not significantly affect the results for
our single-step attack.
B. Limitations of Append Strategies
Besides the inability to append bytes to files that already
exceed the model’s maximum size (e.g., 2MB for MalConv),
append-based attacks can suffer from an additional limitation.
In the MalConv architecture, a PE file is broken into non-
overlapping byte sequences of length 500. With a maximum
file size of 2MB, that corresponds to at most 4,195 such
sequences. The model uses 128 features, meaning only 128 of
the 4,195 sequences can ever be selected. In Figure 2, we select
a random set of 200 candidate malware samples and examine
the file size distribution and which of the 4,195 sequences are
being selected, on average, by the model. This shows that, for
example, while the first 1,000 sequences (0.5 MB) in binaries
correspond to 79% of the actual features for the classifier,
only 55% of the files are smaller than that. Additionally, 13%
of the instances cannot be attacked at all because they are
larger than the maximum file size for the classifier. The result
shows not only that appended bytes need to offset a large
fraction of the original discriminative features, but also that
attacking the byte sequences of these discriminative features
directly will likely amplify the attack effectiveness due to their
importance. Driven by this intuition, we proceed to describe an
attack strategy that would exploit the existing bytes of binaries
with no side effects on the functionality of the program.
C. Slack Attacks
a) Slack FGM: Our strategy defines a set of slack
bytes where an attack algorithm is allowed to freely modify
bytes in the existing binary without breaking the PE. Once
identified, the slack bytes are then modified using a gradient-
based approach. The SLACKATTACK function in Algorithm 2
highlights the architecture of our attack. The algorithm is
independent of the SLACKINDEXES method employed for
extracting slack bytes or the gradient-based method in GRA-
DIENTATTACK used to update the bytes.
Algorithm 2 The Slack FGM attack
1: function SLACKATTACK(x0)
2: m← SLACKINDEXES(x0)
3: e← GETEMBEDDINGS(x0)
4: eu ← GRADIENTATTACK(e)
5: xu ← EMBEDDINGMAPPING(eu)
6: x∗ ← x0
7: for idx in m do
8: x∗[idx]← xu[idx]
9: end for
10: return x∗
11: end function
12: function SLACKINDEXES(x)
13: s← GETPESECTIONS(x)
14: m← ARRAY(0)
15: for i in 0...|s| do
16: if s[i].RawSize > s[i].V irtualSize then
17: rs ← s[i].RawAddress+ s[i].V irtualSize
18: re ← s[i].RawSize
19: for idx in rs...re do
20: m← APPEND(m, idx)
21: end for
22: end if
23: end for
24: return m
25: end function
In our experiments we use a simple technique that empiri-
cally proves to be effective in finding sufficiently large slack
regions. This strategy extracts the gaps between neighboring
PE sections of an executable by parsing the executable section
header. The gaps are inserted by the compiler and exist
due to misalignments between the virtual addresses and the
multipliers over the block sizes on disk. We compute the
size of the gap between consecutive sections in a binary as
RawSize − V irtualSize, and define its byte start index in
the binary by the section’s RawAddress+ V irtualSize. By
combining all the slack regions, SLACKINDEXES returns a
set of indexes over the existing bytes of a file, indicating
that they can be modified. This technique was first mentioned
in [9]. However, to our knowledge, a systematic evaluation
of its effectiveness and the comparison between the slack and
append strategies have not been performed before.
Although more complex byte update strategies are possible,
potentially accounting for the limited leverage imposed by the
slack regions, we use the technique introduced for the FGM
Append attack in Algorithm 1, which proved to be effective.
Like in the case of FGM Append, updates are performed on
the embeddings of the allowed byte indexes and the updated
values are mapped back to the byte values using the L2
distance metric.
# Append Bytes Random Append Benign Append FGM Append
Mini EMBER Full Mini EMBER Full Mini EMBER Full
500 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 1% 13% 13%
2,000 0% 0% 0% 5% 1% 0% 2% 18% 30%
5,000 0% 0% 0% 6% 2% 1% 2% 26% 52%
10,000 0% 0% 0% 9% 2% 1% 1% 33% 71%
TABLE I: Success Rate of the Append attacks for increased leverage on the Mini, EMBER and Full datasets.
V. RESULTS
Here, we evaluate the attacks described in the previous
section in the same adversarial settings using models trained
on the Mini, EMBER and Full datasets. Our evaluation seeks
to answer the following questions:
• How do existing attacks generalize to classifiers trained
on larger datasets?
• How vulnerable is a robust MalConv architecture to
adversarial samples?
• Are slack-based attacks more effective than append at-
tacks?
• Are single-step adversarial samples transferable across
models?
In an attempt to reproduce prior work, we select candidate
instances from the test set set if they have a file size smaller
than 990,000 bytes and are correctly classified as malware by
the victim. We randomly pick 400 candidates and measure
the effectiveness of the attacks using the Success Rate (SR):
the percentage of adversarial samples that successfully evaded
detection.
A. Append Attacks.
We evaluate the append-based attacks on the Mini, EMBER
and the Full datasets by varying the number of appended bytes,
and summarize the results in Table I. The Random Append
attack fails on all three models, regardless of the number of
appended bytes. This result is in line with our expectations,
demonstrating that the MalConv model is immune to random
noise and that the input size is not among the learned features.
However, our results do not reinforce previously reported
success rates of up to 15% by Kolosnjaji et al. [8].
The SR of the Benign Append attack seems to progressively
increase with the number of added bytes on the Mini dataset,
but fails to show the same behavior on the EMBER and Full
datasets. Conversely, in the FGM Append attack we observe
that the attack fails on the Mini dataset, while reaching up
to 33% SR on EMBER and 71% SR on the Full datasets.
This paradoxical behavior highlights the importance of large,
robust datasets in evaluating adversarial attacks. One reason
for the discrepancy in attack behaviors is that the MalConv
model trained using the Mini dataset (modeled after the dataset
used by Kolosnjaji et al.) has a severe overfitting problem.
In particular, the success of appending specific benign byte
sequences from the Mini dataset could be indicative of poor
generalizability and this is further supported by the disconnect
between the model’s capacity and the number of samples in the
Mini dataset. When we consider the single-step FGM Attack’s
success on the EMBER and Full datasets, and its failure on the
Mini dataset, we believe these results can also be explained
by poor generalizability in the Mini model; the single gradi-
ent evaluation does not provide enough information for the
sequence of byte changes made in the attack. Recomputing
the gradient after each individual byte change is expected
to result in a higher attack success rate. Finally, we also
observe a large discrepancy between the SR on the EMBER
and Full models, which counterintuitively highlights the model
trained on a larger dataset as being more vulnerable. The
results reveal an interesting property of single-step gradient-
based atttacks: with more training data, the model encodes
more sequential information and a single gradient evaluation
becomes more beneficial for the attack. Conversely, updating
the bytes independently of one another on the less robust
model is less likely to succeed.
Aside from the methodological issues surrounding dataset
size and composition, our results also show that even a robustly
trained MalConv classifier is vulnerable to append attacks
when given a sufficiently large degree of freedom. Indeed,
the architecture uses 500 byte convolutional kernels with a
stride size of 500 and a single max pool layer for the entire
file, which means that not only is it looking at a limited set
of relatively coarse features, but it also selects the best 128
activations locations irrespective of location. That is, once
a sufficiently large number of appended bytes are added in
the FGM attack, they quickly replace legitimate features from
the original binary in the max pool operation. Therefore, the
architecture does not encode positional information, which is a
significant vulnerability that we demonstrate can be exploited.
Additionally, we implemented the Gradient Append attack
proposed by Kolosnjaji et al., but failed to reproduce the
reported results. We aimed to follow the original descrip-
tion, with one difference: our implementation, in line with
the original MalConv architecture, uses a special token for
padding, while Kolosnjaji et al. use the byte value 0 instead.
We evaluated our implementation under the same settings as
the other attacks, but none of the generated adversarial samples
were successful. One limitation of the Gradient Append attack
that we identified is the necessity to update the value of
each appended byte at each iteration. However, different byte
indexes might converge to their optimal value after a varying
number of iterations. Therefore, successive and unnecessary
updates may even lead to divergence of some of the byte val-
ues. Indeed, empirically investigating individual byte updates
across iterations revealed an interesting oscillating pattern,
where some bytes receive the same sequence of byte values
cyclically in later iterations.
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Fig. 3: Evaluation of the Slack FGM attack on the EMBER and Full models.
B. Slack Attacks.
We evaluate the Slack FGM attack over the EMBER and
Full datasets for the same experimental settings as above.
In order to control the amount of adversarial noise added
in the slack bytes, we use the  parameter to define an L2
ball around the original byte value in the embedding space.
Only those values provided by the FGM attack that fall within
the  ball are considered for the slack attack, otherwise the
original byte value will remain. As illustrated in Figure 3a,
by varying  we control the percentage of available slack
bytes that are modified. The upper bound for the SR is 15%
on EMBER for an attack where 14% (291/2103) slack bytes
were modified on average, while on Full we achieve 28% SR
for 58% (1117/1930). While the attack is more successful
against Full than EMBER, it also succeeds in modifying a
proportionally larger number of bytes. We observe that the
EMBER model returns very small gradient values for the slack
bytes, indicating that their importance for classifying the target
is low. The results also reinforce our hypothesis about the
single gradient evaluation on the FGM Append attack.
In order to compare Slack FGM with the append attacks, in
Figures 3b and 3c we plot the SR as a function of the number
of modified bytes. The results show that, while the FGM
Append attack could achieve a higher SR, it also requires a
much larger number of byte modifications. On EMBER, Slack
FGM modifies 291 bytes on average, corresponding to a SR
for which FGM Append requires approximately 500 bytes. On
Full, the attack achieves a SR of 27% for an average of 1005
modified bytes, while the SR of the FGM Append lies around
20% for the same setting. The results confirm our initial
intuition that the coarse nature of MalConv’s features requires
consideration of the surrounding contextual bytes within the
convolutional window. In the slack attack, we make use of
existing contextual bytes to amplify the power of our FGM
attack without having to generate a full 500-byte convolutional
window using appended bytes.
C. Attack Transferability.
We further analyze the transferability of attack samples
generated for one (source) model against another (target).
We run two experiments with EMBER and Full alternately
acting as source and target, and evaluate FGM Append and
Slack FGM attacks on samples that successfully evade the
source model and for which the original (pre-attack) sample is
correctly classified by the target model. At most 2/400 samples
evade the target model for each set of experiments, indicating
that these single-step samples are not transferable between
models. The findings are not in line with prior observations
on adversarial examples for image classification, where single-
step samples were found to successfully transfer across mod-
els [16]. Nevertheless, we leave a systematic transferability
analysis of other embedding mappings and stronger iterative
attacks for future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
The work by Barreno et al. [17] was among the first to sys-
tematize attack vectors against machine learning, where they
distinguished evasion as a type of test-time attack. Since then,
several evasion attacks have been proposed against malware
detectors. Many of these attacks focus on additive techniques
for evasion, where new capabilities or features are added to
cause misclassification. For instance, Biggio et al. [3] use a
gradient-based approach to evade detection by adding new
features to PDFs, while Grosse et al. [18] and Hu et al. [19]
add new API calls to evade detection. Al-Dujaili et al. [20] pro-
pose an adversarial training framework against these additive
attacks. More recently, Anderson et al. [21] used reinforcement
learning to evade detectors by selecting from a pre-defined
list of semantics-preserving transformations. Similarly, Xu et
al. [22] propose a genetic algorithm for manipulating PDFs
while maintaining necessary syntax. Closest to our work are
the gradient-based attacks by Kolosnjaji et al. [8] and Kreuk
et al. [9] against the MalConv architecture. By contrast,
our attacks are intended to highlight trade-offs between the
append and slack strategies, and to test the robustness of
the MalConv architecture when trained on production-scale
datasets. Additionally, to our knowledge, the transferability
of single-step adversarial attacks on malware has not been
previously studied despite prior work that suggests it is best
suited for mounting black-box attacks [16].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the space of adversarial examples
against deep learning-based malware detectors. Our experi-
ments indicate that the effectiveness of adversarial attacks on
models trained using small datasets does not always gener-
alize to robust models. We also observe that the MalConv
architecture does not encode positional information about the
input features and is therefore vulnerable to append-based
attacks. Finally, our attacks highlight the threat of adversarial
examples as an alternative to evasion techniques such as
runtime packing.
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